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Abstract:  Prepared for a forthcoming book on the distribution 
sector in Japan, this essay introduces the distribution network in the 
apparel industry.  We note the varying patterns of cross-market 
contracting and intra-firm organization in the industry, and trace the 
economizing logic involved.  More specifically, we show how the 
decision at the firm level of whether to integrate wholesale, retail and 
production depends crucially on an informational and incentive-based 
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  “They’re all the same.  None of ‘em are exciting.”  The sale of men’s business 
suits had fallen since 1992 in Japan and that, apparently, was how one industry 
executive explained it (Senken, 1999: 132).  He was surely right, of course, though 
the explanation bordered on the apocryphal economist’s reason for the long line at the 
movie theater:  the price was too low.    
  For fifty years, charcoal (or navy) suits had been the uniform of choice 
(oxymoronic to be sure) for Japanese men.
1  Before World War II, the country had 
remained heavily agricultural, and had had a manufacturing comparative advantage 
primarily in unskilled factory work.  Come 1950, matters changed.  Over the next two 
decades, in droves young men abandoned the farm for the city, the shop for the office, 
and coarse cotton uniforms for worsted wool suits.  From 1950 to 1960 to 1970 to 
1980, the population in agriculture fell from 16 million to 13 to 9 to 5 (Nihon tokei, 
1987: I, tab. 3-7).  Over the same period, the population in white-collar jobs (men in 
professional, technical, managerial, official, or clerical posts) climbed from 4.1 (in 
1952) to 5.3 to 7.0 to 8.7 million (id., at tab. 3-11).   
  To this work, the new “salary man” -- as he called himself -- wore a wool suit.  
He sported a blue (not red) silk tie, and a white (not blue) cotton shirt with a straight 
(not button-down) collar.  He wore black (not brown) shoes and belt.  Cuff-links were 
a personal option.  
  In turn, the new salary man obtained his suits through a process that illustrates 
the organization of distribution in one sector of the apparel industry.  His well-heeled 
fiancée found her Parisian dress in a process that illustrates it in another.  Together, 
the two processes show both how distributional patterns reflect the direction and 
volatility of underlying consumer preferences, and how a change in those preferences 
will shift the structure of distribution.  
  The industry itself is huge.  By government estimates, the Japanese apparel 
industry had some 20 trillion yen in mid-1990s sales and employed 2.8 million 
workers.
2    Yet despite that size, observers (whether U.S. critics or Japanese 
bureaucrats) routinely characterize it as inefficient, exclusionary, and opaque.
3  From 
raw cotton or wool to retail shelves, a garment traverses a long chain of firms and 
brokers.  Within that chain, critics argue, the firms and brokers contract by medieval 
customary practices that only loosely track the terms of any documents they exchange. 
In this chapter, we use standard economic theory (though we focus on the 
empirics and keep citations to theory at a minimum) to unravel the informational and 
risk-bearing rationale for these distributional patterns.  Largely, we find that the firms 
involved adopt patterns that allocate risks to the firms with the incentives and 
information necessary to bear risk most cheaply.  Often, they also accomplish what 
one might have thought core intra-firm functions through cross-market transactions.  
                     
1 When not otherwise noted, most of the current data are from widely available sources such as 
the Toyo keizai kaisha shikiho. 
2 Matsuo (1999: 2).  The Table 3 figures are for production only. 
3 Even the industry itself takes that position at times.  See Sen’i kogyo (1991).  That the 
industry is not inefficient or exclusionary is suggested, however, by the fact that several of the 
“problems” identied by the industry involve discounting and other forms of price competition.  Id.  
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Whether they locate those functions within a firm or across markets similarly depends, 
we conclude, on a least-cost-avoider logic.   
All told, three further points follow.  First, in the context of a competitive 
retail market the informational logic to the distributional practices illustrates their 
essential efficiency.  That efficiency, in turn, is reflected in the absence of large total 
distribution markups.  Second, the ease with which parties can shift distribution 
strategies illustrates their non-exclusivity.  That non-exclusivity is reflected as well in 
the speed with which apparel imports increased when exchange rates changed in the 
1980s.  What then of the pervasive claims of opacity from U.S. lawyers and legally 
trained Japanese bureaucrats?  Given the straightforward economic logic to the 
distribution patterns, these claims probably just demonstrate (as if we needed another 
demonstration) the essential blindness of legal education.  
We begin with a lengthy description of the distribution process in the apparel 
industry itself.  We start with one pole of the industry:  the conservative world of 
men’s business suits (Section 1.1.1).  This is an exceptional segment of the industry, 
albeit exceptional in a way that illustrates how consumer preferences and 
technological change can cause massive changes in distributional practices.  From this 
sector, we turn to more mainstream segments, and study the traditional distribution 
practices for high-end (Section 1.1.2) and middle-market (Section 1.2) apparel.  Using 
standard law-&-economic theory, we explore the ties between retailing and 
production (Section 2), and the impact of several recent changes in distribution 
(Section 3).  We close by outlining the implications all this poses for the efficiency, 
exclusivity, and opacity of the industry (Section 4).   
 
1.  APPAREL RETAILING 
1.1  The High-End 
  1.1.1.  Men’s business suits.  To wear to their new white-collar jobs, post-war 
Japanese men bought business suits in enormous numbers.  On a population of 105 
million, in 1971 Japanese bought 8.6 million suits and 5.0 million sports coats; on a 
population of 124 million in 1990, they bought 12.2 million suits and 7.1 million 
sports coats (Miwa, 1994:  34; Nihon tokei, 2000: 2).  Where Japanese men bought 
13.9 million suits in 1988, Americans (with roughly twice the population) bought 15.5 
million (Miwa, 1994: 35).  For these suits, Japanese men in the early post-war years 
paid dearly.  In 1960, for a new bank clerk a tailor-made suit cost nearly two-months’ 
salary (id.).   
 
 1.1.2.    Department stores.  Introduction.  To buy these suits, Japanese men 
went to “department stores.”
4   What Rodeo Drive is to Los Angeles and North 
Michigan Avenue to Chicago, department stores have been to post-war Tokyo.  By 
tradition, suits were not sold through tailors, and the highest status labels did not 
maintain boutique shops. Instead, both suits and fashion went through department 
stores.  A gentleman looking for a new suit did not go to a local haberdasher.  He 
went to a department store.  A lady trolling for the latest from Paris or Milan did not 
browse through Hermes or Ferragamo shops.  She combed the department stores.   
                     
4 In 1998 department stores earned 41.2 percent of their sales from clothing generally, and 9.1 
percent from men’s clothing.  They earned 24.8 percent of their sales from women’s clothing, 3.2 
percent from children’s clothing, and 4.1 percent for other clothing items (Depaato, 1999: 93).  In 1990, 
Japanese spent about 4.3 trillion yen on apparel.  Of this, they spent 1.5 billion (36 percent) on men’s 
apparel, 2.2 billion (50 percent on women’s apparel, and the remainder on children’s apparel (Nihon 
sen’i, 1992: 97-100).   
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  Genesis.  The oldest of these department stores traced their roots to operations 
antedating the 1868 Meiji Restoration.  The venerable Mitsukoshi, for example, began 
as a Tokyo (then-Edo) draper in the 17th century.  Today, it stands at the apex of the 
retail status hierarchy (see sales at Table 3.1.B).  The Matsuzakaya (founded 1910), 
Takashimaya (1919), Matsuya (1919), and Daimaru (1920) chains all began pre-war 
as well. 
  Despite these antecedents, the explosive growth in department stores dates 
from the 1950s.  From 1948 to 1958, department store floor area jumped 160 percent; 
from 1959 to 1969, it climbed another 65 percent.  From 1948 to 1969, the number of 
department store employees increased from 30,000 to 130,000 (Depaato, 41).   
Mitsukoshi may have started in the 1600s, but the Seibu, Tobu, Tokyu, Hankyu, 
Hanshin, Keio, Odakyu, and Kintetsu stores are all part of private railroad networks 
serving the bedroom suburbs that grew so explosively post-war.  Osaka-based Hankyu 
had one full-scale department store before the war.  Since then, it has built eight more 
(Hankyu, 1998).  Of the current 28 central Tokyo department stores, only 9 were open 
by 1950.  By 1970, 21 were (Table 3.2).   
Essentially, the department stores developed in tandem with the new patterns 
of consumer behavior that blossomed in the 1950s and 1960s.  Many of these 
phenomena came from the West, and for many the department stores were the ports of 
entry.  The Takashimaya department store brought Pierre Cardin to Japan, while 
Daimaru brought Christian Dior (Nihon sen’i, 1992: 113).  The Seibu stores single-
handedly brought to Japan Yves Saint Laurent, Hermes, Van Clef and Arpels -- and, 
more recently, Polo Ralph Lauren and Armani (Hashimoto and Koyama, 1991: 430).   
  Today, department stores dominate high-end shopping.  Even during a bad 
recession (as in mid-October 2000), a visit to one is not an event lightly undertaken by 
a college professor without substantial consulting income or textbook sales.  Take the 
Ikebukuro Tobu.  With floor space of 85,944 square meters, by size it is the second 
largest in Tokyo (see Table 3.2).  By status, it falls somewhere in the middle of the 
pack.   
  Tobu has two basement levels, and nine floors above ground.  On one 
basement floor it sells upscale groceries, along with the usual stratospheric items 
(purchased primarily as gifts) that the Tokyo guidebooks love to detail:  apples and 
Asian pears at 800 yen each (the exchange rate was 108 yen/$), a matsutake 
mushroom at 9,000 yen (for one mushroom), tuna at 1,598 yen/100g ($67/lb.), and 
Japanese beef at 3,333 yen/100g ($140/lb.).  It also offers reasonable if nice deli items 
and box lunches:  closest to the subway entrance, it places an enormous array of 
affordable take-out dinners for busy middle-class families.  On the second basement 
floor it stocks additional gift food items:  pastries, boxed cookies with German and 
French names, traditional Japanese food gifts, Godiva chocolates at 300 yen a truffle.  
  Above ground, Tobu maintains a layout reflecting both its variety and its 
dependence on a female clientele.  It has one floor for cosmetics; one for women’s 
accessories and shoes (Gucci, Versace, Celine, and so forth); two floors for women’s 
clothing and jewelry (including Anne Klein, Calvin Klein, Issei Miyake); one floor 
for men’s clothing and shoes; one for home furnishings; one for children’s toys, books, 
and office supplies (like a 120,000 yen Waterman pen); one for sporting goods; and 
one for kimonos.  Above all this, it carries seven floors of restaurants. 
 
Contractual practice.  “Gone today, here tomorrow,” Alfred Knopf allegedly 
(and perhaps apocryphally) observed as he watched the delivery trucks leave his  
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publishing company warehouse.  In much the same vein, Japanese department stores 
buy apparel with a right to return.  Already in the mid-1950s, apparel makers began 
offering the department stores this right.  Junzo Kashiyama, founder of the giant 
Onward Kashiyama firm, introduced the arrangement in 1953 (see Table 3.1.A; 
Nikkei ryutsu, 1993: ch. 15).  Before then, department stores had taken title to the 
goods with no right of return.  As a result, found Kashiyama, they regularly bought 
insufficient stock and ran out of merchandise before the end of the season.  Rather 
than have unsold stock, they bought insufficient quantities.   
At root, the department store buyers did not know the volatile new market for 
western-style clothing well enough to make sensible decisions.  Founded in 1947, 
Onward Kashiyama was new at the game too, but as a national specialist it knew more 
than the department stores.  Given his firm’s superior market expertise, Kashiyama 
promised to take back anything unsold.  In exchange, he ensured that he did not lose 
sales for lack of department store stock. 
To handle the resulting business risk, Kashiyama took two steps.  First, he 
kept control over price (hence the customary resale price maintenance in this sector).  
Second, he sent employees to the stores daily to monitor sales.  If an item moved 
slowly, he either withdrew it from the store or lowered its price.  If it sold quickly, he 
shipped more.   
Not only did these seconded employees give Onward Kashiyama immediate 
information about which products sold most quickly.  They also talked directly and 
regularly to the firm’s ultimate clientele.  Instead of learning indirectly what 
department store buyers thought consumers wanted to buy, Kashiyama employees 
could hear from consumers themselves. 
Through this arrangement, Kashiyama effectively shifted many of what one 
might consider retailing functions to the apparel maker.  Although the department 
store remained the retailer in form, in significant ways the apparel maker became the 
retailer in substance.  It decided price, controlled stock, provided some of the sales 
force, and paid the department store what was effectively a sales-based floor rental 
charge.  
Given that apparel makers generally knew the market better than the 
department stores, Kashiyama’s arrangement soon became the industry norm.  The 
actual contractual terms varied, but generally took one of three forms.  Sometimes, the 
department store obtained title to the goods but kept a customary right to return 
unsold merchandise at full price.  Sometimes it took title but retained a contractual 
right to return it.  And sometimes it took the goods on consignment.  In each case, it 
implicitly paid a premium for the return right.  
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Table 3.1:  The Apparel Industry 
 
 
A.  Top Apparel Makers, by Sales (billion yen) 
 
Total Apparel     Women’s Apparel   Men’s Apparel  
 
Renown 199  Itokin 124  Onward  K  89 
Onward K  168   World    110  San’yo S  47 
Itokin   135  Renown   91  D’ urban  46 
San’yo S  130  San’yo S   79  Renown  42 
Gunze  127  Onward K   74  Minoya  34 
 
Notes:  All figures are for fiscal 1995, except 
San’yo shokai and Durbin, which are for calendar 1994. 




B.  Top Apparel Retail Chains, by Sales (billion yen) 
 
   Dept Stores     Mass Market   Spec. Stores    Mail Order 
  App   App   App   App   App       App 
  Sales  %    Sales  %   Sal  M/F  
 Sales  
 
Mitsuk  285 37.1  Daiei   554 21.8  Aoyama  168  M  Cecile  136 
Takash  266 37.6  Ito Y  446 29.0  Leilian  85  F  Nissen   84 
Marui  264 53.7  Nichii  302 29.8  Suzutan  82  F  Senshukai   77 
Seibu  240 36.3  Jusco  256 22.4  Aoki I   82  M  Muto   51 
Daimaru 199 38.1  Seiyu  217 21.0  Suzuya   65  F  Charles   50 
Isetan 194  47.2 Yunii  175  28.6 Zebio    65    M 
Matsuz 178  41.0 Nagas  143  37.7 San’ai   55    F 
Tokyu  131  40.2 Shimam 113  99.4 Konaka   52    M 
Hankyu  123 38.9  Izumiya  94 23.5  Takakyu  46  M 
Kintet  102 35.8  Kotobu   84 31.2  Cabin   46  F 
 
Notes:  All figures are for fiscal 1995, except 
San’ai and Konaka, which are for fiscal 94, and Relian, 
which is for calendar 94. 
Mitsuk = Mitsukoshi; Takash = Takashimaya; Matsuz = 
Matsuzakaya; Kintet = Kintetsu; Ito Y = Ito yokado; Nagas 
= Nagasakiya; Shimam = Shimamura; Kotobu = Kotobukiya; 
Aoyama = Aoyama shoji; Aoki I = Aoki International. 
Sharure sells door-to-door. 
 
Source:  Takeyuki Matsuo, ed., Apareru gyokai 
handobukku [Apparel Industry Handbook] 65, 67, 81, 82, 84, 
96 overleaf (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimposha, 1996).  
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Table 3.2:  Central Tokyo Department Stores, 1998 
 
 
    Sales area       Sales 
      (sq. meter)  (billion yen)   Opened 
Mitsukoshi (Nihon bashi)  92,095  284.6  1673 
Tobu (Ikebukuro)  85,944  149.7  1962 
Tokyu (Shibuya)  74,081  148.6  1967 
Seibu (Ikebukuro)  73,814  277.7  1940 
Isetan (Shinjuku)  62,511  250.1  1933 
 
Odakyu (Shinjuku)  59,858  135.1  1962 
Takashimaya (Shinjuku)  56,100   75.3  1996 
Takashimaya (Nihon bashi)  50,687  206.3  1933 
Seibu (Shibuya)  43,236   62.3  1968 
Matsuzakaya (Ueno)  41,828   80.4  1768 
 
Keio (Shinjuku)  41,292  106.0  1964 
Tokyu (Nihon bashi)  35,223  31.3 
Sogo (Kinshicho)  35,160  15.0  1997 
Mitsukoshi (Shinjuku)  34,395  46.5  1929 
Daimaru (Yaesu)  32,631  71.6  1954 
 
Matsuya (Ginza)  31,576  64.7  1925 
Takashimaya (Tamagawa)  25,767  43.8  1969 
Matsuzakaya (Ginza)  25,467  26.8  1954 
Mitsukoshi (Ikebukuro)  25,026  34.3  1957 
Mitsukoshi (Ginza)  23,350  65.7  1930 
 
Matsuya (Asakusa)  18,908  19.8  1931 
Mitsukoshi (Ebisu)  17,893    1994 
Printemps (Ginza)  16,541  28.8  1984 
Seibu (Yurakucho)  15,581  19.4  1984 
Sogo (Ginza)  15,275  17.0  1957 
 
Hankyu (Shinagawa)  15,068  11.6  1953 
Hankyu (Yurakucho)  14,721  18.9  1984 




  Source:  Depaato nyusu sha, ed., Hyakkaten chosa 
nenkan [Department Store Survey Annual] (Tokyo:  Depaato 
nyusu sha, 1999). 
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1.2.  The Middle-market: 
If Japanese browse the department stores when they want something 
especially “nice,” they frequent the mass-market chains for their more quotidian needs.  
Sometimes translated “general merchandise stores,” sometimes as “super stores,” 
these outlets are what Americans would probably call middle-market department 
stores.  Most date from the 1960s.  Positioned variously in the enormous expanse 
between Wal-mart and Sachs, they are large stores that sell a wide variety of 
merchandise (about 30 percent of it apparel).  Some, like Daiei, hang their appeal on 
low prices.  Others, like Ito-Yokado, hang it on good value at a slightly higher price.  
But each of the three largest chains sells more apparel than the largest department 
store (Table 3.1.B). 
  Make no mistake -- these are not discount stores.  There are discount apparel 
outlets in Japan, but Daiei and Ito Yokado are not it.  Take one ordinary Ito Yokado in 
the Tokyo suburb of Higashi-kurume.  It had three sales floors with total sales space 
of 14,000 square meters, and 1998 sales (for this store alone) of 14 billion yen.   
Above those three floors, it had five stories for parking.  It devoted half the first floor 
to food-stuffs, but none of it for gifts.  As of mid-October 2000, the most expensive 
apple was 200 yen, Asian pear 250, matsutake mushroom 1,580, tuna 278 yen/100g, 
and beef 980 yen/100g.  On the same day, a determinedly price-sensitive housewife in 
the neighborhood could have found apples for 60 yen and Asian pears for 100.  She 
could not have done much better on the tuna, but could have bought imported U.S. 
beef at 128 yen/100g.  A determinedly price-sensitive housewife would have skipped 
the matsutake and used shiitake mushrooms instead. 
  On the rest of the first floor, the store stocked bags, shoes, women’s apparel, 
cosmetics, jewelry, and assorted household items.  It had more apparel on the second 
floor (including men’s and children’s).  It carried additional household items, toys, 
books, sporting goods (even bicycles), watches, and restaurants on the third.  A 
consumer could find a 1.5 million yen diamond ring, but not many.  A consumer 
could find Vuitton, Celine, Prada, and Fendi hand bags, but the store gave more space 
to American Tourister.  For shoes, a consumer would mostly have found running 
shoes and nondescript brands like Regal.  
  Ito Yokado and Tobu both carry apparel, but not all apparel is equal.  In large 
part, stores like Ito Yokado sell goods that show the greatest price sensitivity, and 
about which consumers can most easily gauge quality. Underwear is perhaps the 
clearest example, and constitutes a major part of the apparel sold at Ito Yokado.
5  
Consistent with its emphasis on price-sensitive goods, the store also carries a large 
assortment of children’s clothing. 
  This stratification by product mix is clearest at true discount stores like 
Shimamura.  With 92 outlets, the chain had fiscal 2000 sales of 205 billion yen.  Of 
those sales, 23 percent were underwear and 28 percent sleepwear.  Consider one outlet, 
perhaps a mile from the Ito Yokado above.  Where Ito Yokado was clean and spiffy, 
Shimamura was dirty and unkempt.  Racks and tables of clothes stood in elaborate 
disarray, while half-opened boxes of stock blocked the aisles.  Where Ito-Yokado 
offered courteous staff (if fewer than at Tobu) ready and able to restock and rearrange, 
                     
5 Underwear is also a significant segment of the industry.  In 1990, Japanese spent 4 trillion 
yen on apparel (excluding shoes).  Of this, they spent 469 billion (11.6 percent) on underwear and sleep 
wear.  By contrast men spent only 441 billion on suits, jackets, and tuxedos (Nihon, sen’i, 1992: 97-
100).   
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the harassed few workers at Shimamura had all they could do to keep the cash 
registers running. 
  But it was cheap -- oh, so cheap:  fleece pullovers for 900 yen, wool sweaters 
for 1,900, dress shirts at 1,300 (with some on sale at 500 to 900), dress slacks at 1,900, 
belts at 400 to 1,500, and silk ties at 900 to 1,900.  Underwear and socks it carried in 
all sorts of brands.  In addition to a wide variety of Japanese brands by firms like 
Gunze, it had such foreign brands as BVD (by Fukusuke, made in Japan), Lee (by 
Naigai, made in Japan), and Champion (by Fukusuke, made in Vietnam). 
 
2.  PRODUCTION  
2.1  Introduction 
So far, this discussion presupposes that there are firms that manufacture 
garments -- firms one could sensibly call “apparel makers.”  Given that consumers do 
buy apparel made by firms, of course, there must be firms that make apparel.  Yet in a 
curious sense this is an industry without manufacturers.  Instead, it is an industry 
where an enormous number and variety of firms contract across markets to produce 
the merchandise collectively.   
 
2.2  Thread Production 
To see this, begin with the organization of production (we include a much 
abridged summary in Figure 3.1).  Other than synthetics, the industry mostly imported 
its raw materials -- in 1997, 185 billion yen’s worth.
6  A total of 913 establishments 
(not all of them separate firms) with 8,700 workers imported this material.   
Traditionally, these importers would have sent the wool or raw cotton to a 
Japanese spinning firm.  The firms dominated pre-war Japanese manufacturing, and 
even today include 540 establishments with 25,700 workers.
7  Often they function as 
the principal fabric maker, coordinating production among the many participants.   
Given their high labor costs, however, foreign firms compete fiercely for the work:  in 
1997, foreign spinners shipped 193 billion yen’s worth of thread and yarn to Japan 
(see Table 3.3; Figure 3.2).   
Thread brokers (922 establishments with 6,600 workers) bought the thread or 
yarn from the spinning firms, and sent it to firms that finished and sometimes dyed it 
(5,480 establishments, 23,600 workers).  Depending on the material, the thread or 
yarn (perhaps again through a broker) then went either to a weaving or to a knitting 
firm (31,800 establishments, 169,300 workers).  After producing the fabric, that firm 
in turn sold it to a fabric wholesaler (6,005 establishments, 52,900 workers).  As 
necessary, a wholesaler might send the fabric to a print shop (6,305 establishments, 
75,200 workers).  Given labor costs foreign firms compete at this stage too:  in 1997, 
foreign firms shipped fabric worth 218 billion yen.  
                     
6 Unless otherwise indicated, the figures in this discussion are from Senken (1999: 149), for 
1997. 
7  Synthetic fiber manufacturers operated bigger factories -- 94 establishments with 20,800 
workers.  
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Figure 3.1:  Apparel Production 
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or spinning firm) 
⇓        Textile maker 
Thread finishing       (possibly  a  synthetics  or 
spinning 
  (including dying)         firm, a trading company, or a 
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Shipping         Apparel maker 
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  Source:  Senken shimbun sha, ed., Yoku wakaru apareru gyokai 
[Easy to Understand -- The Apparel Industry] 66-67 (Tokyo:  Nihon 
jitsugyo shuppan sha, rev. ed., 1999), as modified. 
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Table 3.3:  World Apparel Production 
 
 
                 App Workers Production (A) Wages   (B) Wages 
                  (x 1000)   $ million     $/hr       
$/hr 
 
U.S. 954.0  36.9    7.34
 7.09 
Turkey 450.0  11.0    3.29   
Japan 421.0  36.7  12.75
 9.15 
Italy 310.0  26.9  13.25 
Mexico  254.3   4.4   0.66
 1.78 
ROK 195.0  18.0    3.00
 3.69 
Hongkong 166.4  11.0    3.53 
U.K.  165.2   9.4   6.10 
Indonesia  150.0   6.0   0.45 
France 150.0  13.0  12.91
 6.77 
South Africa  130.0   1.5   1.77 
Germany 124.4  16.6  20.10
 9.94 
Malaysia 100.0  -    1.20 
 
 
Notes:  Wages are average wages in the apparel 
industry in U.S. $/hour.  (A) are for 1994, except for 
U.K., Hongkong, and Korea, which are from 1993, and are 
based on data from the International Apparel Federation.  
(B) are for 1993, and are based on International Labor 
Organization data.   
 
Source:  Senken shimbun sha, Yokuwakaru apareru 
gyokai [Easily Understood Apparel Industry] 46, 48 
(Tokyo:  Nihon jitsugyo shimbun sha, rev. ed., 1999). 
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  Source:  Nihon sen’i shimbun sha, ed., Sen’i fasshon 
nenkan [Textiles, Fashion Annual] (Tokyo:  Nihon sen’i 
shimbun sha, 1992). 
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2.3  The Apparel Maker 
Enter the apparel maker.  It might design a garment itself.  Or it might 
approach a designer for a new garment (the famous designers seldom maintain 
substantial manufacturing capacities of their own).  It might place one of its house 
brands on the garment.  Or it might pick from among the brands it licensed from other 
(perhaps foreign) firms.
8   
The apparel maker might manufacture the garment in house.  Some do have 
modest manufacturing capacity.  Usually, though, it will approach independent 
factories for production on an as-needed basis (50,890 establishments, 566,700 
workers).  It will keep almost no fabric or thread in stock, but buy it instead through 
brokers.   
Upon receiving an apparel maker’s order, a factory will buy printed cloth from 
a wholesaler and construct the garment.  The apparel maker will take delivery, and 
ship it either to a retailer directly or to a garment wholesaler (23,200 establishments, 
286,800 workers).  In 1997, these wholesalers handled domestic garments worth 
16,102 billion yen.  Additionally, they imported garments worth another 2,298 billion, 
and exported 223 billion.  Of the retailers, department stores (2,364 establishments, 
156,800 workers) handled 6,616 billion yen’s worth of merchandise.  The other 
outlets (183,633 establishments, 644,524 workers; as noted later, this excludes 
convenience stores) handled 11,795 billion yen’s worth.
9 
That wholesalers (or brokers) play such a large part in the apparel industry 
reflects the division of labor into very small operations.  For these small firms, the 
wholesalers provide information about the market, economize on search costs for 
trading partners, bear risk, and sometimes provide finance (Itoh, 1994: 22-23).  When 
one of the parties is large (a spinning firm, for example) that firm will often by-pass 
the wholesaler.  Indeed, the largest spinning firms had already integrated forward into 
weaving before the Second world War (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2000b).  As all of this 
should make clear, however, in most cases the apparel maker is just another 
wholesaler.  In effect, it is simply a hub that coordinates the final half of the 
production process.   
 
3.  NEW CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS 
3.1  Business Suits 
As labor costs in Japan rose after the war, apparel makers steadily improved 
the technology for ready-made suits.  Back in 1960, over half the suits sold in Japan 
had been made to order.  From 1970 to 1980 to 1989, that fraction fell from 39 
percent to 12 percent to 6 percent (Miwa, 1994: 34).   
In turn, the shift to ready-made suits reduced the comparative advantage to 
department stores in the market for business suits.  When selling suits, the department 
stores had bonded the skills of their tailors through their large reputational capital.  
After all, consumers saw business suits as a major capital investment, but could gauge 
construction quality only ex post.  Because off-the-rack construction allowed them to 
                     
8 Some foreign brands are imported as brand garments, but many are produced locally under 
license.  The C. Itoh trading company (and its apparel affiliate), for example, controls 19 brands which 
it sublicenses to a variety of firms.  The Mario Valentino brand it sublicenses to 24 firms that produce 
35 items under the label.  The Beverly Hills Polo Club label it sublicenses to 21 firms to produce 30 
items (Nihon sen’i 1995: 286). 
9 The figures for “other outlets” exclude convenience stores, as explained later.  Note that not 
all merchandise passes through wholesaling channels.   
  14 
judge quality ex ante, it necessarily reduced the returns from a retailer’s reputational 
capital.  In the process, it opened the way for consumers to buy their suits from places 
without premium reputations. 
Once consumers could judge construction quality before buying, the 
distribution of men’s suits changed radically.  The two firms that most successfully 
exploited the new opportunities were the Hiroshima-based Aoyama shoji and the 
Yokohama-based Aoki International.  A variety of others like Konaka followed (see 
Table 3.4).     
Aoyama opened its first store in 1974.  By 1998, it had sales of 162 billion yen 
on 667 outlets.  Aoki had 76 billion in sales on 281 outlets.  Rather than locate in 
urban centers or at the major commuter line train terminals, these new firms opened 
outlets along suburban highways and roads.  By doing so, they lowered their rent, and 
took advantage of the increased car ownership and modern highway networks. 
Both Aoyama and Aoki specialized in basic business suits and related items 
(shirts, ties, and so forth).  Combined with their multi-store network, this let them 
exploit scale economies in two dimensions.  First, because business suits change only 
slowly, they have a relatively long shelf life.  As a result, Aoyama and Aoki could 
place orders covering longer periods, and offer longer lead times.  Those lead times, 
in turn, enabled manufacturers to handle Aoyama and Aoki’s orders during slack days 
when their machinery would otherwise have been idle.   
Second, because Aoyama and Aoki operated such large chains, they could 
consolidate orders across the country.  The resulting larger lot sizes then enabled them 
to lower construction costs through the usual scale economies.  For what they did to 
other firms in the sector as a result, Aoyama and Aoki earned the sobriquet “category 
killers.” 
What with larger lot orders and longer lead times, however, Aoyama and Aoki 
faced major business risks.  Suits are expensive.  As a result, a firm that orders them 
in quantities large enough to generate scale economies will necessarily gamble more 
capital than a firm generating comparable economies on undershirts.  To control the 
resulting risk, Aoyama and Aoki needed accurate information about consumer 
preferences.   
To obtain that information, Aoyama and Aoki integrated forward into retailing.  
They did not integrate to control “image,” for their suits had no distinctive image to 
control.  The firms themselves developed a reputation for selling sensible, reasonably 
priced suits, but that was an image they readily could have protected through contract 
rather than vertical integration.  They did not integrate to protect relationship-specific 
investments.  Their outlets presented little specific investments to protect.  Other than 
firm-specific billboards, the outlets were much like any other nondescript if clean 
clothing outlet.  
Instead, by integrating they obtained direct control over the personnel with the 
best access to information about consumer preferences.  To be sure, a firm can obtain 
market information from independent retailers.  A firm can also operate a few 
vertically integrated outlets and sell the rest of its output to independent retailers.  In a 
variety of sectors, makers regularly choose such options.  Aoyama and Aoki, however, 
found that they obtained more current and accurate information by controlling directly 
the entire retail operation.  
  As businessmen turned to these suburban chains for their basic suits, the 
department stores shifted their focus toward high-end, high-fashion suits.  Granted, 
they still carry conservative ones similar to those of their suburban competitors.  Yet 
the conservative suits at department stores are not cheap, and are not central to the  
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store’s focus.  Tobu, for example, sold basic business suits for 50,000-70,000 yen, and 
crowded them into small areas.   
By contrast Tobu generously allocated space to the fashion brands.  Jackets at 
70,000 yen and up (58,000 yen if in corduroy) and suits at 100,000 yen and up -- these 
it displayed prominently.  For casual wear, a man could find a polyester fleece 
pullover from S.T. DuPont for 49,000 yen.  For business occasions, he could buy a 
Dunhill suit at 140,000 yen, or an Armani at 170,000 yen.  He could survey the 
offerings from Hickey-Freeman, Hugo Boss, or (the determinedly not high-fashion) 
Brooks Brothers.  He could buy a Ferragamo sport coat for 320,000 yen, or 
Burberry’s version of the raincoat well-dressed canon fodder wore into the trenches at 
Maginot for 175,000 yen.  On another floor, he could cap the look with a Patek 
Philippe watch for 1.4 million yen or Blancpain at 1.6. 
By contrast, at a suburban Tokyo Konaka outlet (runner-up to Aoyama-Aoki), 
a consumer could choose from among a large selection of business suits, but almost 
no designer labels.  Around the corner from the Shimamura described earlier, for 
example, in October 2000 he would have found two floors of perhaps 300-400 square 
meters each.  There, he would have paid 30,000 to 40,000 yen for a sport coat or 
20,000 to 70,000 yen for a suit.  He would also have found a wide variety of both on 
sale at half price.  He could buy a fleece pullover at the more predictable 2,000 yen.  
A mile away at Ito Yokado, he could similarly have bought a suit for 30,000-50,000 
yen, and found others at a further 50 percent discount.  At Shimamura he would have 
found no suits, but could have picked up a wool sport coat for 5,800 yen. 
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Table 3.4:  Retail Sales of Men’s Apparel 
 
 
       Sales     Number 
       (bil.  y)      outlets 
Aoyama shoji  162.2  667 
Aoki International   76.2  281 
Konaka   51.5  257 
Haruyama shoji   49.5  221 
Takakyu   32.3  230 
Mitsumine   19.8  133 
Workman   18.5  353 
Futata   17.6  102 
Daisan shinshi fuku   16.6   93 
Haruyama Chain   16.3  110 
 
 
    Notes:  Figures are for fiscal 1998. 
 
    Source:  Nikkei ryutsu shimbun, Ryutsu keizai no 
tebiki 2000 [2000 Handbook of the Economics of 
Distribution] 211 (Tokyo:  Nihon keizai shimbun, 1999). 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3.2.  Volatile Sectors 
3.2.1  Young chic.  Harajuku.  At the same time that the department stores 
were losing men’s business suit sales to Aoyama-Aoki, they were also losing sales in 
the most volatile sectors of the industry:  the market for young women’s apparel.  As 
assiduously as they cultivated the high-fashion segment of the industry, the 
department stores had avoided the youth-market fringe.  As consumer incomes rose, 
however, so did product-differentiation and the size of several fringe markets.  By 
their inherent conservatism, the department stores had left unclaimed the market for 
the most aggressively trend-conscious.  Out of the Harajuku section of Tokyo, several 
firms moved to capitalize on their “mistake.”  
At the close of the century, the most successful firms in the youth fringe were 
San’ei International and Five Foxes.  Both firms had roots in Harajuku and its fashion 
industry, roots that antedated its current incarnation as hyper-chic promenade ground.  
At the time, the neighborhood was instead just the site of not-very-successful 
designers and apparel makers.  Several of them (including the current San’ei and Five 
Foxes CEOs), were good friends and operated out the same building (the Laforet 
Harajuku).  Through their friendship, they formed the Harajuku Apparel Council to 
promote the local industry.  At one point they even fielded a city council candidate 
under the “Harajuku Fashion Party.”  Through their proximity, they eventually created 
the collective ambience that made Harajuku the hip capital it is today.
10 
Both San’ei and Five Foxes ran specialty private label stores.  Like Aoyama 
and Aoki, they used these stores to control the retail process.  They valued that control, 
                     
10 See www.hac.or.jp/v/vol-miyake.html (Nov. 2000).  
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though, for two reasons very different from the reason the business suit makers valued 
it.   
 
Repeat purchases.  Because young women buy more apparel items per year 
than business men buy suits, firms in the youth market rely heavily on repeat 
purchases.  As a result, they stand to capture large gains from cultivating brand-
specific appeal.  And cultivate it they do.  Where Aoyama and Aoki offered generic 
white-collar uniforms, the youth-market stores invest heavily in brand-specific image.  
Toward that end, they directly control retail decor, staffing, marketing, and 
advertising.  
Take San’ei International.  The firm had begun as a wholesaler in the 
cosmetics industry.  Determined to cultivate this cutting-edge image, it developed its 
own products and retail formula.  Whether it opened its own stores or sold through 
department stores, it used similarly formulaic boutiques.  When it moved into apparel, 
it sold its own labels, often in its own stores, and always through its consciously 
developed formula.  By the late 1990s, it ran integrated apparel operations from 
design to retail.  It placed its merchandise in a portfolio of 20 brands with elaborately 
choreographed images for each.  It ran 600 retail outlets, employed 2,200 full-time 
workers, and earned sales of 61 billion yen. 
 
Response time.  On the cutting edge of fashion consumer preferences change 
at extraordinary speed.  To respond, apparel makers depend crucially on information 
about day-to-day purchasing patterns.  By controlling retail operations directly, firms 
in the youth market fringe could structure their sales process in a way that gave them 
that daily information.  Aoyama and Aoki needed information too, but note the 
difference:  Aoyama and Aoki needed it to mitigate the risks they bore by placing 
large-lot orders with long lead times; firms like San’ei needed it precisely because 
their lead times were so short.  Like NASCAR, like apparel:  “one thing you learn in 
racing,” as Roger Penske put it, “is that they don’t wait for you.” 
Crucially, both San’ei and Five Foxes used vertical integration not just for 
image but for speed.  Founded in 1976, by the end of the 1990s Five Foxes had 
eclipsed San’ei with 123 billion in sales.  Of that, it earned 40 percent on women’s 
apparel, 26 percent on men’s, and 25 percent on children’s.  It carried 5,000 full-time 
employees, owned 789 stores directly, and sold through another 200 outlets (e.g., 
franchised stores or department store counters) besides.  Like San’ei, Five Foxes 
integrated wholesale and retail; not only did it run its own stores, it coordinated 
garment production (with 70 manufacturing firms) and used its own brands (e.g., 
Comme ça du Mode).  Through that coordination, it could rapidly respond to changes 
in consumer buying patterns. 
To facilitate the rapid shifts, several apparel makers (and not just those in the 
youth market) self-consciously adopted aspects of what the industry called a “quick 
response” (QR) system.  Short-hand for an elaborate array of changes, many 
involving the use of computerized sales data, the system reached back to garment 
manufacturing (see Figure 3.1).  Importantly, it did not reach further upstream.   
Instead, even the most nimble apparel makers used fabrics produced under long lead 
times and stockpiled until needed (Senken, 1999: 78-79, 172-73; Matsuo, 1996: 28-
29). 
 
3.2.2  Cheap chic casual. -- In the market for office and weekend casual, Fast 
Retailing (the name says it all) similarly integrated wholesale with retail to cut  
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response time (Ann. Rep.).  The firm traced its origins to a 1949 Yamaguchi men’s 
shop, but hit the winning formula in 1984 with its first Hiroshima “Uni-Qlo” store.  
From there, it boomed:  100 stores by 1994, 200 by 1996, 300 by 1997.  At the end of 
fiscal 1999, it owned 357 stores and ran another 11 by franchise.  With 1,000 
employees, it earned 111 billion yen in sales.  “[K]haki casual is replacing the dark 
suits in which the Japanese marched out of poverty after World War II,” Newsweek 
announced in November 2000 (Itoi, 2000: 16).  If ever an announcement was as 
premature as Mark Twain’s famous demise this was one, but more than anyone else 
the firm that profited from the (at least impending) end of the long march was Uni-
Qlo.  
Like Aoyama and Aoki, Fast Retailing focused mostly on suburban outlets.  
But unlike them, it sold casual clothes for men, women, and children -- what it called 
“non-age uni-sex casual wear,” and what others called Gap-clone.  Uni-Qlo stood for 
“unique clothing warehouse,” it told its shareholders in its 1999 annual report.   
Quality uniformity was part of its business strategy, declared Newsweek (Itoi, 2000: 
17), for Uni-Qlo sold “the same products and service to anybody, anywhere and at 
any time.”  But so was rapid response to consumer demand.  “In the past, what was 
fashionable in Tokyo was not necessarily fashionable in Osaka, let alone outside 
Japan,” explained Uni-Qlo founder Tadashi Yanai (id., at 18).  “There is no more time 
lag.”  To gain the necessary speed, Fast Retailing did what San’ei and Five Foxes did 
in Japan and what the Gap does in the U.S.:  it integrated the process from product-
planning to wholesale to marketing to sales.
11 
By the end of the 1990s, the formula generated enormous success.  Given 
higher Gap prices, claimed one industry observer, every time a Uni-Qlo store opened 
near Gap, Gap lost 30 percent of its sales (id., at 19).  Given its star quality, the 
Mitsukoshi, Tokyu, Matsuzakaya, and Sogo department stores were all vying for a 
Uni-Qlo boutique (id.).   
 
3.3.  Between Suits and Fashion: 
 3.3.1    The gains to diversified sales.  Firms in the conservative sector of 
business suits integrate wholesale and retail.  Firms in the volatile sector of young 
women’s apparel integrate wholesale and retail.  Firms in the new, mass-market 
casual sector integrate wholesale and retail.  If firms in both conservative and volatile, 
high-priced and low-priced sectors integrate, why do not all firms do so?  The short 
answer is that a vast expanse -- a vast market -- lies between Comme ça du mode and 
Uni-Qlo pullovers.   
In apparel as in other markets, firms can economize through specialization and 
the division of labor.  The best wholesalers are not always the best retailers, and vice 
versa.  Rather than try to reach consumers itself, a wholesaler can often do better 
buying its retailing services on the market.  Rather than try to buy from factories 
directly, a retailer can often do better buying wholesaling services on the market.   
  Put another way, firms choose between market and intra-firm transactions by 
relative gains and costs, and in many sectors of the apparel industry the gains from 
integration are small.
12  In particular sub-markets, firms can indeed earn large gains 
                     
11 See yahoo.marketguide.com/mgi/busidesc.asp?rt=busidescandrn=3677N (Nov. 2000).  To 
monitor production more effectively, in 1997-98 it cut the number of factories with which it contracted 
(most were in China) by two-thirds.  For the same reason, the next year it opened an office in Shanghai. 
12  Sometimes, argue observers, firms integrate to promote efficient levels of relationship-
specific investments.  Perhaps they do, though we and others have argued that they exaggerate the real- 
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from market information.  Sometimes they can best obtain that informational 
advantage through vertical integration.  Suppose an apparel maker can earn scale-
economies through large investments of working capital.  It may integrate to obtain an 
informational advantage that reduces the risks the investment entails.  Suppose it faces 
an usually volatile market.  It may integrate to obtain the information it needed to 
respond to sudden changes in consumer buying patterns.   
Yet most apparel falls outside of those sectors.  Dress shirts are relatively 
cheap.  To make one efficiently, a firm need not invest anything close to the amounts 
it would need to generate scale economies in suit production.  Neither do men’s dress 
shirts change quickly.  To meet market demand, a firm need not follow consumer 
buying patterns day-by-day.  Much the same logic applies to socks, underwear, 
children’s clothes, and most apparel for “mature” buyers (like the authors of this 
chapter).   
 
3.3.2  Wholesaling only.  Absent peculiar gains to vertical integration, an 
apparel maker will generally find that the standard gains from scope and scale 
economies point toward marketing its products broadly.  By way of example, consider 
San’yo Shokai, a firm with fiscal 1999 sales of 136 billion yen (Ann. Rep.).  It earned 
27 percent of those sales on men’s clothing, 58 percent on women’s and children’s, 
and 15 percent on accessories.  It sold both to department stores and to other retailers.  
San’yo earned these massive sales on 2,000 employees.  It could do so because it 
made nothing.  Although nominally an apparel maker, it was in fact an apparel 
planner and buyer rather than a manufacturer.   
San’yo shokai diversified across both consumer sex and retailer types.  In turn, 
through this diversification it could exploit economies of scope that yielded 
economies of scale.  To retailers, it could offer a wide variety of merchandise that 
varied by construction quality, by style, by target audience age, by target income.  
Through its marketing expertise, it effectively could assemble a full product line at 
low cost.  In offering that product line, it thereby increased its attractiveness as a 
trading partner for retailers, and captured the larger order volumes that generated scale 
economies.  
 
3.3.3  Manufacturing only.  Contrast Wacoal, a company with fiscal 1999 
sales of 138 billion yen (Wacoal, 1999; Ann. Rep.).  Where San’yo bought what it 
sold from other factories, Wacoal manufactured almost everything in-house through 
its vast network of subsidiaries and affiliated corporations (16,000 employees, all 
told).  Where San’yo offered a full range of apparel, Wacoal focused on underwear:  
in fiscal 1998, it had sales of 62 billion yen in foundation garments, 41 billion in 
lingerie, 12 billion in “personal wear” (e.g., robes), and 3 billion in “active wear” 
(sports wear).  
Although it mostly sold only underwear and sleep-wear, within this sector 
Wacoal produced a wide variety.  Whether bras or lingerie, it made a wide range for a 
wide range of retailers.  As with San’yo, it could do so because of the economies of 
scope.  The process was different, to be sure:  San’yo could exploit its marketing 
expertise to assemble a broad range of products; Wacoal could exploit its 
manufacturing expertise to produce several varieties of underwear.  In each case, 
                                                           
world significance of such investments (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000; Miwa and Ramseyer, 
2000a).  Whatever the case in theory, no one claims firms make significant relationship-specific 
investments in apparel distribution.  
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though, the firm gained by selling to a broad range of retailers.  Through the resulting 
economies of scope, it captured large lot orders.  Through the large order volumes, it 
generated manufacturing scale economies. 
Wacoal was only one of many large specialty apparel manufacturers.  For 
example, Fukusuke had fiscal 1999 sales of 68 billion, but 60 percent of it in socks.  
Its competitor Atsugi had sales of 38 billion yen, again mostly in socks and panty 
hose.  Tsukamoto had sales of 46 billion, 30 percent of it in traditional garments like 
kimonos.  Its competitor Ichida had 48 billion yen in sales, 39 percent in kimonos.  
Yamaki had sales of 22 billion yen, all in shirts, while its rival Tomiya Apparel had 
28 billion yen in sales, 74 percent in shirts.  And Tokyo Soir had 22 billion in sales 
too, but almost all in formal wear -- 65 percent of that black.  
Firms in the underwear segment particularly gain by selling to broad range of 
retailers.  Not only can they sell to the entire spectrum of apparel outlets from Tobu to 
Ito Yokado to Shimamura, they can also sell to the convenience stores.  Besides food 
and drinks, these elaborate networks generally offer round-the-clock socks and 
underwear.  Although they thus sell apparel, note that the number of apparel retailers 
given elsewhere in this chapter omit them.  By government statistical custom, those 
numbers instead include only retailers for whom apparel sales are primary.   
The wildly successful 7-11 franchise (50.7 percent owned by Ito Yokado) with 
8,200 outlets, for example, stays open 24 hours a day.  Suppose a harried mother of 
three awoke at 6:30 a.m. to find not only that she was out of milk but that she had 
forgotten to do the wash.  While buying the milk at the 7-11 two blocks from home, 
she could pick up socks and underwear for her children besides. 
 
3.3.4  Mixed wholesaling and manufacturing.  Return, finally, to Onward 
Kashiyama with its 165 billion yen in fiscal 2000 sales (Ann. Rep.).  Of those sales, 
Kashiyama earned 42 percent from men’s apparel and 55 percent from women’s and 
children’s.  Not only did it diversify by consumer sex, it also diversified across 
product and quality lines.  For retailers, it offered both suits and sports wear for men, 
dresses and other garments for women.  Some of this it manufactured in-house:  e.g., 
suits, dresses -- 92 billion yen’s worth in fiscal 2000.  Others it bought already made:  
e.g., sports wear -- 40 billion yen’s worth. 
San’yo generated scope economies in marketing, Wacoal generated them in 
manufacturing, and Kashiyama generated them in both.  Although the nature of the 
economies of scope differed, in each case the firm could transform them into scale 
economies.  And to do so, in each case it needed to be able to sell its output to a broad 
range of retailers.  Although the firms needed market information, to be sure, any 
informational advantage they might earn by bringing retail in-house would have cut 
their economies of scope.   
 
4.  IMPLICATIONS   
American trade negotiators in the 1990s persistently claimed that Japanese 
distributional practices were inefficient, exclusionary, and opaque.  Japanese 
bureaucrats were all-to-eager to agree.  Yet the discussion above suggests that the 
existing practices followed a straightforward cost-based logic.  That very logic 
suggests the practices were efficient and transparent; their mutability suggests they 
were not exclusionary.   
Two further considerations point to the efficiency of those practices.  First, the 
retail apparel market is highly competitive.  Japanese consumers buy apparel from a 
wide variety of retailers (183,600 outlets, not counting department stores or  
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convenience stores), and those retailers compete against each other fiercely.   
Necessarily, they leave little room for inefficient distributional practices -- for 
retailers who rely on inefficient wholesalers will regularly lose to those who do not.   
The effects of the competition appear day to day, year to year.  As Aoyama 
and Aoki boomed, Takakyu slid; as a few of the department stores grew, Sogo filed 
for bankruptcy, Tokyu closed its Nihonbashi store and Kintetsu stopped Tokyo 
operations.  Among the smaller retailers, stores disappear regularly.  Given this 
competition in the retail market, inefficient distributional patterns could persist only if 
retailers took their sources as given.  The radical changes in sectors like men’s suits, 
young women’s apparel, and office casual, however, indicate they take them as 
anything but given.   
Second, distribution margins are low.  In Table 3.5, we compare wholesale 
and retail mark-ups in textiles for the U.S. and Japan.  Crucially, the mark-ups in the 
two countries are remarkably close.  For thread (for which we have a longer time 
series), the mark-up is slightly lower in Japan in the 1970s, and slightly higher in the 
1990s.  If they are high anywhere in Japan, moreover, they are not high among the 
multiple wholesale levels.  They are high at retail. 
Nevertheless, persistently critics point to the many levels through which a 
garment passes in Japan.  Surely, they suggest, this multiplicity is inefficient.  To 
demonstrate the point, they calculate total wholesale sales paid as a multiple of the 
retail sales (W/R), and show how much higher the Japanese ratio (W/R) is than 
elsewhere:  1.57 for France, 1.80 for West Germany, 1.87 for the U.S., and 2.03 for 
the U.K. -- and 4.24 for Japan (Miwa, 1991: 89; 1982 data except 1985 for Germany).    
As a measure of distributional efficiency, however, the W/R ratio is irrelevant.  
Fundamentally, the ratio does not measure efficiency.  It measures the extent of 
vertical integration.  Posit two identical production channels.  They use the have 
machines, employ the same quality and size work force, and generate the same sales 
and costs.  In one channel, a single company owns all the factories, while in the other 
separate firms own each factory.  Although the two channels have (by hypothesis) 
identical production efficiency, in the former the W/R ratio is low while in the latter it 
will be high.  Or consider the automobile industry.  Because Japanese automobile 
manufacturers use more subcontractors than American manufacturers, in the 
manufacturing process a Toyota will pass through more firms than a Chevrolet.  If one 
calculated the W/R-equivalent for cars (total intermediate payments/retail price), the 
Toyota ratio would indeed be higher than the Chevrolet.  Yet few observers would 
claim that GM’s production is more efficient than Toyota’s.   
That innovative entrepreneurs like Aoyama and Fast Retailing can develop 
entirely new distribution channels similarly suggests apparel distribution is not 
exclusionary.  The distributional system could plausibly exclude competitors -- 
whether domestic or foreign -- only if innovators could not avoid it.  Yet depending 
on the structure of consumer preferences they do avoid it.   
Foreign firms regularly enter the apparel market, and sometimes they succeed.  
During the 1980s, high-end foreign brands sold enormously well in Japan.  They sold 
so well that many abandoned their licensing arrangements for wholly or partially 
owned Japanese subsidiaries (what observers at the time called a “Japan boom,” after 
the many new locally incorporated subsidiaries with names like “Georgio Armani 
Japan”).  During the 1990s recession, middle-tier brands like Lands’ End, L.L. Bean, 
and Benetton thrived too, but some of the fims on the high end continued to do well.  
By the end of the decade, Japan had become the largest market (30 percent of total  
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sales) for Vuitton’s “Celine” brand (Nikkei shimbun, Nov. 8, evening ed.).  Vuitton 
itself was planning to build in Ginza it’s largest store ever.   
Suggestive evidence of the ease with which foreign producers can enter the 
market also appears in the way changes in relative costs affect import volumes.  To 
illustrate the tie between costs and imports, in Figure 3.3 we track the response of 
textile imports to exchange rate fluctuations.  The point is simple.  As the costs of 
foreign apparel fell relative to Japanese apparel, consumers switched to foreign 
sources in massive numbers.  
What of the complaints that Japanese distribution is opaque?  Partly in 
response to American claims about opacity, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry declared that it would try to reduce (a) the use of free-returns and 
consignment sales arrangements; (b) the use of manufacturer-seconded employees in 
retail; and (c) the consummation of transactions on terms other than those in the 
written contract (Nihon sen’i 1992: 117-18).  Given the straightforward cost-based 
rationale to the practices,
13 we find it hard to understand why anyone would think 
them anything but transparent.
14 
Nonetheless, lawyers said they did.  Persistently, they either found the 
practices hard to understand, or found it convenient to claim they did.  So long as one 
used basic economic logic, Japanese distribution followed a predictable path.  If 
lawyers really did find them opaque, maybe opacity too -- to mangle an aphorism 
hopelessly -- is in the eye of the beholder. 
                     
13 We do not here discuss the logic to transactional terms deviating from written contracts.  For 
an excellent analysis of the issue, see Bernstein (1996). 
14 Given that MITI also promised to try to reduce the use of volume rebates and discounts 
below manufacturer-suggested retail prices, efficiency and consumer welfare were obviously not what 
the negotiations were about.  
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Table 3.5:  Industry Mark-ups 
 
A.  Textiles 
 
Japan    1980 1985 1990   1995 
  Total  Mark-up  51.10 53.08 53.52 52.73 
   Wholesale      13.09  14.16 
   Retail      39.34  30.66 
 
 
United States  1982 1987   1992 
  Total  Mark-up  43.30 46.19 52.17 
    Wholesale      6.96 
    Retail    44.82 
 
 
B.  Thread Only 
 
Japan    1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
  Total  Mark-up  24.6 31.1 30.0 33.5 41.2 40.3 40.5 53.0 
    Wholesale    11.6 11.4 12.0 13.4 11.6 11.6 16.2 
    Retail    19.5 18.6 21.5 27.8 28.7 28.9 36.8 
 
 
United States  1693 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 
  Total  Mark-up  45.2 49.1 45.1 47.6 47.1 47.0 48.06 
 
 
  Notes:  Total mark-up equals the total payments made 
by consumers in the industry, less the total payment 
received by the manufacturer, divided by total consumer 
payments, in percentages.   
  Wholesale and retail refer to the amount of Total 
mark-up received by retailers and wholesalers 
respectively.  Wholesale and retail together do not sum 
to the “total” because of the omitted transportation 
sector. 
 
  Source:  See Nishimura, Tachibana and Tsubouchi 
(this volume), Table 2.3. 
 
  




  Source:  Nihon sen’i shimbun sha, ed., Sen’i fasshon 
nenkan [Textiles, Fashion Annual] 76 (Tokyo:  Nihon sen’i 
shimbun sha, 1992). 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
  Factories, brokers, importers, wholesalers, retailers -- the Japanese apparel 
industry presents an apparently bewildering array.  Instead of a few big firms, it 
presents many small.  Instead of integrated operations, it presents cross-market 
contracts.  Instead of routinized long-term relations, it presents ties in flux. 
As chaos, however, this is deceptive chaos.  The way firms organize and 
reorganize, negotiate and renegotiate follows simple economic principles.  Largely, 
they do so by a logic that tracks access to information, scale and scope economies, 
and incentives to economize.  Largely, the result is an industry in flux, but in 
predictable flux.  It is an industry where firms pick organizational and contractual 
structures that maximize their competitive advantage.  It is an industry that firms enter 
and leave as they gain and lose competitive advantage.  Like most industries, it is an 
industry where firms pursue efficient arrangements or die. 
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